Washington, DC - Following an initial investigation into an August 2002 incident where much of a railcar's contents were released to atmosphere, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) issued in December 2002 an advisory regarding chlorine transfer equipment, particularly transfer hoses.
Washington, DC – Following an initial investigation into an August 2002 incident where much of a railcar’s contents were released to atmosphere, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) issued in December 2002 an advisory regarding chlorine transfer equipment, particularly transfer hoses. Although CSB has yet to issue official findings, early analysis indicate the release was caused by a hose rupturing during transfer followed by the failure of automatic isolation equipment despite indications the automatic isolation equipment was frequently tested and found to be in good working order.
This incident points out the risk of design faults when material compatibility is overlooked. CSB believes that despite the metal braided hose being marked as compatible with chlorine it was not. Sources close to the investigation indicate the isolation valves stroked properly, however the seat/ball/plug connections were substantially corroded and allowed significant amounts of chlorine to pass through the closed valve. All organizations using chlorine are urged to review material compatibility of their transfer equipment, including transfer hoses, isolation valves, and check valves.
For more information, visit www.chemsafety.gov
Control Engineering Daily News Desk
Dave Harrold, Senior Editor
[email protected]
